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Abstract
We investigate which factors inuence 44,649 employeesdecision to
invest in a top retail banking group in France. We have two objectives:
(i) to explore factors associated with the amount invested in the plan,
and (ii) to explore whether these factors have same associations with the
probability of investing more than the incentive pay i.e. being an active
investor. Specically, we focus on four parameters that have been shown to
a¤ect participation: liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan,
asset choice, and transaction costs. We conrm Engelhardt and Madrian
(2004) assumptions according to which such factors contribute to explain
non-participation. We show that ESPP contributors have very specic and
unobserved motivations, as shown with the positive correlations between
error terms in the two steps of investment decisions. The existence of
unobservable investment motives can be explained by a lower risk aversion,
a higher time preference, or a strong willingness to participate to corporate
governance.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, incentive pay arrangements have become a widespread
phenomenon. In the United States, it has been estimated that 38.7 million
employees are concerned by such schemes, representing approximately 20% of
private sector employees (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2010). In
France, the number of employee stock owners has increased from 700,000 in 1998
to 2.7 millions in 2007 (French Employee Ownership Association, 2009). This
increased success has been driven by a permanent support from companies
executive managers and governments (Kruse, 2002). For instance, incentive
pay schemes that are usually bundled with ESPPs have a major inuence on
investment decisions. Usually, tax-free accruals of interest and tax-deductions
are given for all contributions corresponding to an allocation of incentive pays.
Moreover, companies usually provide matching contributions when employees
invest in ESPPs, which have been shown to increase employeesparticipation
(Huberman et al, 2007).
While there has been a large interest in company-based plans savings be-
haviors, few research articles were dedicated to the exploration of investment
behaviors in ESPPs. Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) explain that in addition
to risk aversion, four main factors can inuence the decision to participate or
not in ESPPs: liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset
choice, and transaction costs. Non-investors would have a lower income, a lower
access to ESPPs-related information, a lower willingness to invest in company
stocks, and would face higher behavioral biases such as procrastination and self-
defeating behavior. According to Engelhardt and Madrian (2004), these four
characteristics distinguish investors from non-investors. However, Engelhardt
and Madrian (2004) do not test empirically these assumptions. To our knowl-
edge, the inuence of these factors on investorsbehaviors in ESPPs has not
been studied from an empirical perspective. Moreover, the relationship between
incentive pay mechanisms and ESPPs remains unclear. Among investors, two
main behaviors can be identied. On the one hand, some employees choose to
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invest an amount that is lower or equal to their incentive pay. For these employ-
ees, ESPPs investment may represent a way to increase their after tax income
through deductions. On the other hand, some employees choose to invest more
than their incentive pay, e.g. allocate to company stocks money that does not
come from their job compensations. These latter employees make an arbitrage
in favor of their company stocks within their overall wealth. Currently, there
is no evidence that these factors will have the same associations with the deci-
sion to be an "active" investor, e.g. invest more than their incentive pay. For
these "active" ESPPs investors, investment motivations may be di¤erent. Their
willingness to become an employee owner or to save for the future may be very
important in the decision process.
In this paper, we explore the association between ESPPs investment deci-
sions and incentive pay mechanisms. Specically, we study whether liquidity
constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs
have same associations with the amount invested in ESPPs and the decision
to become an "active" investor, conditional on participation. We identify char-
acteristics associated with a higher probability of participating in ESPPs, and
higher level of investment in ESPPs, conditional on participation. We distin-
guish "active" investors (who invest more than their incentive pay and/or up
to the threshold) from other investors. We consider that investment decisions
results from a two-step decision process : employees simultaneously decide to
participate in the o¤er (or not) and how much to participate.
The determinants of ESPPs participation are relatively understudied, due to
the lack of availability of appropriate data. Much of the literature has focused
on relatively small datasets and/or US data. This paper uses an original a
cross-sectional dataset describing investment decisions of 44,649 employees of a
large French bank who were eligible to ESPPs investments in 2005.
We nd that several proxies describing the presence of liquidity constraint,
knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs are associated with dif-
ferences in the probability of investment in ESPPs, and the conditional amounts
invested. We also nd the presence of a signicant association between the two
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steps of the investment decision process: investment choice (yes vs. no) and how
much to invest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature on employeesinvestment behaviors. Section 3 describes the
methods used and section 4 reports the results obtained. Section 5 presents a
discussion of our empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Our paper aims at investigating the factors associated with ESPPs participa-
tion. Specically, we explore the association between the presence of liquidity
constraint, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice and transaction costs
with the decision to invest and the level of employees investment decisions.
2.1 Liquidity constraint
Several factors can be used to control for the presence of liquidity constraints.
Degeorge et al (2004) show that labour income and nancial wealth are major
determinants of participation in France Telecoms ESPPs. Liquidity constraints
can be driven by labour income, which depends on human capital. Aubert
and Rapp (2008, 2010) show that some human capital proxies such as educa-
tion and seniority are associated with investment decisions in company-based
savings plans. The current value of human capital is often modeled as a func-
tion of the current labor income, its rate of growth, and the temporal horizon
during which it will be paid. According to Jappelli (1990), the probability of
facing liquidity constraints is a decreasing function of age, wealth and current
income. Moreover, Jappelli and Pagano (1998) show that household credit and
mortgage can be used as indicators of liquidity constraints. The nature of the
job contract (permanent or temporary) may also a¤ect investment in ESPPs
since unemployment threats may motivate investment decisions of risk averse
employees who wish to cover themselves against future risks. Huberman et
al. (2007) show that plan participation increases with compensation, and that
4
matching contributions have higher impact on poorest employees. This result
can be explained by the fact that low-income employees are more likely to face
liquidity constraints and are therefore more sensitive to matching contribution
mechanisms.
2.2 Imperfect knowledge of the plan
Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) emphasize how ESPPs imperfect knowledge
can result in non-participation, because some employees may face troubles to
understand the plans features and make uninformed decisions on participation.
Previous research (Engelhardt and Madrian, 2004; Degeorge et al, 2004) pro-
vide evidence that communication dealing with ESPPs within the rm may be
critical and that ESPPs-related information are usually lacking. Engelhardt
and Madrian (2004) explain that nancial seminars are usually given to pro-
vide 401(k) plan information, leaving little time to ESPPs-related information.
Poterba (2003) suggests that most employers should develop education seminars
to improve employeeseducation on risks, returns and diversication or hand
out informed consent forms for employees whose savings are highly concentrated
in company stocks. Finally, rms can a¤ect employeesinvestment decisions in
their company stocks (see Benartzi et al (2006) for a review). Aubert and Rapp
(2010) underline that employeesrisk exposure in company-based saving plans
may become problematic if employers play an important role in investments
process.
2.3 Asset choice
Another reason for non-participation discussed by Engelhardt and Madrian
(2004) is the availability of company stocks outside ESPPs. According to Engel-
hardt and Madrian, employees may not see ESPPs as an opportunity to increase
their gross compensation, but rather as a mean to incorporate company stocks
into the overall savings portfolio. To investigate this explanation, they exam-
ine the relationship between the receipt of stocks options and participation in
ESPPs. But they nd little support that participation in ESPPs decreases
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when company shares are available elsewhere through stocks options. Benartzi
and Thaler (2001) explain that investors may distinguish company stocks from
other assets, e.g. consider ESPPs as separate investment options. Huberman
et al (2007) nd that 401(k) savings rate increase when company stocks is of-
fered as an investment option especially among low-income employees. Poterba
(2003) underlines that the potential costs of poor diversication due to massive
investments in company stocks is concerning.
2.4 Transaction costs
Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) nally mention procrastination as a potential
cause of non-participation in ESPPs. Procrastination is a particular type of
self-control problem investigated by Thaler and Shefrin (1981). In standard
time value of money calculation, one dollar saved today would be perceived
to be worth exponentially more in decades from now. On the contrary, pro-
crastination means that individuals are hyperbolic discounters applying high
discount rates to the near term and lower discount rates to the future (Mitchell
and Utkus, 2004). In the French context, this e¤ect may be higher since par-
ticipantscontribution to ESPPs must be frozen during a 5-year period. This
restriction does not apply to American ESPPs participants who are allowed to
sell out the shares the same day they buy them. Other transaction costs may be
associated with investing in ESPPs. According to Degeorge et al (2004), search
costs deterred employees to invest in ESPPs o¤ered by France Telecom in 1997.
This cognitive cost includes the time and e¤ort of analyzing and understand-
ing the rules of ESPPs. The transaction costs may also result from switching
money from an existing savings plan provided outside the company to the spon-
sors plan. Gale and Scholz (1994) explain that this cost is less burdensome for
richer employees.
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2.5 Motivations for exploring ESPPs investment behav-
iors
The di¢ culty with exploring investment behaviors in ESPPs has been described
in previous research (Aubert and Rapp, 2008, 2010). From a theoretical per-
spective, the challenge arises from the fact that ESPPs introduce a correlation
between the risks associated with working and saving contracts. This corre-
lation between human capital and portfolio risks is absent in most theoretical
models of expected utility. Such models usually consider that risks associated to
human capital and nancial portfolio are independent. However, this assump-
tion cannot be applied in the case of ESPPs investment because employees are
supposed to buy their company stocks.
Another explanation of potential divergence between theory and empirical
evidence comes from the existence of bias in saverseconomic rationality. Stan-
dard saving and consumption models describe investment behaviors using two
parameters of preferences: risk aversion and time preference. According to
the theory, savers prefer exibility, i.e. the possibility to proceed to portfolio
adjustments (Kreps, 1979). The reliability of both parameters is debated by
the behavioral approach. Investors can hardly follow coherent saving strategies
based on their lifecycle because of two main reasons (Benartzi and Thaler 2004;
Madrian and Shea 2001). First, some savers are not foresighted, and cannot plan
their long term nancial resources. Second, some households are impatient and
cannot respect their own saving rules. These households display strong prefer-
ences and need for current income. Since investments in ESPPs are constrained
by early withdrawal restrictions, they may be more attractive for foresighted but
impatient agents who wish to self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). However,
potential threats involving the correlation between human capital and portfolio
risks may discourage risk-averse investors. Instead of trying to reshu­ e their
assets in order to balance risk and performance, some savers may retain the
same investment patterns over time, even if it leads them to face huge portfolio
risks. Such rigid saving patterns may result from inertia behaviors (Benartzi
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and Thaler 2002).
3 Methods
3.1 Data
Our sample is an original dataset collected in August, 2005 from a French CAC
40 index listed bank. Data were collected after this bank o¤ered to its employee
the opportunity to invest in ESPPs in June, 2005. Our data describe employees
response to that o¤er. Similar o¤ers occurred in this company in 2001 and 2003.
The eligibility was extended to all employees that had been hired at least two
months before the o¤er occurred, and to retired employees. Eligible employees
were able to invest up to 25% of their gross compensation to purchase their
company stocks at a price equal to 85% of its fair market value. ESPPs investors
become shareholders of the rm they work for.
Incentive pay and sponsorsplans contributions were bundled, and framed
by four main rules. Employees had to choose between getting the incentive
pay in cash and have it included in their taxable income; or having the money
put into the plan and excluded from their taxable income. Amounts invested
in ESPPs were blocked for a 5-year period until 2010. Early-withdrawals were
possible under specic conditions such as lay-o¤, divorce or bankruptcy. Com-
pany stocks could not be sold until 2010. The maximum amount each employee
could contribute to the o¤er was e40,000.
3.2 Sample characteristics
Our sample includes 44,649 employees eligible to ESPPs investments in 2005.
Contributorssocio-demographic characteristics include age, tenure, hierarchical
rank in the bank, gender, type of contract (permanent or temporary), education,
and place of residence. We also have information on the banks department
each employee works for. Financial information includes incentive pays earned
in 2005, annual gross salary, contributions in ESPPs in 2005, and the employees
ESPPs investments before 2005. We exclude 1,287 employees who have missing
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values regarding their hierarchical rank in the bank. Our nal sample consists
of 43,362 employees eligible to the o¤er
3.3 Model specication
Our objectives are to explore whether liquidity constraints, imperfect plan in-
formation, asset choice, and transaction costs are associated with (i) amounts
invested in ESPPs and (ii) the probability of being an "active" investor, con-
ditional on participation. Because of non-randomness of participation choices,
our analyses may face the presence of selection bias. As ESPPs investments
introduce a correlation between employees human and nancial capital they
are more risky than other nancial investments. It can therefore be assumed
that ESPPs contributors have a lower risk aversion than non-investors.
3.3.1 Determinants of amount invested, conditional on participation
Since we have data on participants and non-participants, we address potential
selection bias problems using the Heckmans two-steps procedure (Heckman,
1979). The rst step of the model can be written as:
pi = I(zi + vi > 0) (1)
The I(:) function equals 1 if the employee i invests in the o¤er and is zero
otherwise. We assume that the error terms in the selection equation, v, has
zero-conditional mean and follows a standard normal distribution.
The second step of the model is given by:
log(yi) = xi + ui (2)
We observe log(yi) if pi = 1:The equation (2) can be written as:
E[log(yi)jpi = 1; xi] = xi + u(zi^) + ui (3)
where u is the standard error of the disturbance u, and (:) is the inverse
Mills ratio (IMR). The IMR is estimated as the prediction of the binomial probit
(1) in the rst step and used as an explanatory variable in the second step. The
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second step uses an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) linear regression where the
dependent variable is the logarithm of invested amounts.
The selection function has a set of explanatory factors zi that are a superset
of xi: Indeed, Wooldridge (2009) explains that two-steps regressions need a vari-
able that is associated with selection (decision to invest or not) but that is not
associated with amounts invested. This exclusion restriction is recommended as
the IMR can be highly correlated with the elements of xi. In that case, it would
be very di¢ cult to separate sample selection from misspecication. To prevent
potential multicollinearity problems between the IMR and other covariates, we
control for one more right-hand side variable in the rst ste than in the second
step. This identication variable represents mean ESPPs investments in former
o¤ers per department. It is relevant for the choice to invest or not in ESPPs,
as it can be assumed that employees working in departments with investments
in former ESPPs have a higher probability of participating in new o¤ers (Duo
and Saez, 2002). This variable is not associated with the level of investment.
3.3.2 Determinants of being an "active" investor, conditional on par-
ticipation
To determine the probability of being an "active" investor, we use a binomial
probit model with selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981). The formulation
is written as:
y1 = x11 + u1
y2 = x22 + u2
(4)
u1
u2

 N

0
0

;

1 
 1

where latent variable y1 , which measures whether the employee invests more
than his incentive pay, or up to the e40,000 participation limit, depends on
factors x, and the binary outcome y1 = 1 arises when y1 > 0:
In this model, y1i is observed only when the selection equation has a value
of 1, e.g. when the employee participates in ESPPs:
y2i = (x2 + u2i > 0) (5)
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The potential correlation between the error terms of the two equations is
measured with the parameter . Rejecting the null hypothesis for  indicates
the presence of selection, e.g. a dependence across estimated equations. In the
rst step, we control for an identication variable measuring the mean number
of investors in the o¤er per department. This variable is associated with the
probability of investment in the o¤er but it is not associated with the probability
of being an "active" investor. Finally, the signicance of interaction terms in
Probit models is measured using likelihood ratio (LR) tests.
3.3.3 Variables
Our independent variables of interest are factors describing the presence of liq-
uidity constraint, knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs. The
set of individual characteristics included in our models are therefore related to
these four factors. Liquidity constraint is measured by gross income (continu-
ous, in logarithm), incentive pay (continuous, in logarithm), and the presence
of a permanent contract (vs. temporary contract). We create a proxy vari-
able to measure whether employees have a position within the human resources
department, which is in charge of implementing ESPPs. This proxy captures
information dealing with the knowledge of the plan. We also control for a vari-
able measuring the number of previous o¤ers to which employees were eligible in
the past (two ESPPs occured before 2005). This variable allowed us to capture
additional information dealing with ESPPs knowledge, assuming that employ-
ees with previous eligibility had better knowledge. To measure the inuence of
asset choice on the investment decision, we create a continuous variable indicat-
ing the proportion of the plans sponsored by the company (including previous
ESPPs and the company savings plan) invested in company stocks. Transac-
tion costs, e.g. indirect cost of understanding ESPPs rules is measured with a
variable describing nancial expertise. This variable is a proxy that measures
whether the employee has a job requesting nancial knowledge within the bank:
investment department, asset management department, insurance department,
private equity department, and nance department.
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We also control for additional socioeconomic characteristics that have
been shown to be associated with investment behaviors. Most of these variables
can be associated with at least one of the four investment factors described
above. We create a continuous variable indicating the di¤erence between 2005
and employeeshiring date (tenure). Potential gender di¤erences are studied
using a dichotomous variable whose value was 1 if the employee was a man, and
0 otherwise. The variable education is a dummy variable which value is one if
the employee holds a MastersDegree, and 0 otherwise. A dichotomous variable
measured employeeshierarchical rank (> 6; range 0-10) in the company. The
MastersDegree variable measures general skills, when nancial knowledge, hi-
erarchical level, and nature of the job are three variables that capture specic
skills. We control for a variable describing whether the employee is living in
the Paris area (vs. living in other part of France). Indeed, Balligand and Fou-
cault (2000) show that employees in the Paris area have a higher probability of
holding company stocks.
Finally, we control for three interaction terms: Age  Age captures
potential non-linearity of investment with age, Tenure  Age measures the
interaction between tenure and age, and Male  Paris captures interactions
between residency and gender. Signicance of these interaction terms in non-
linear regressions are estimated with likelihood ratio tests.
3.4 Sensitivity analyses
Sensitivity analyses explore how endogeneity biases could inuence our regres-
sion results, and focus on potential multicollinearity issues. Variables such as
education, type of contract, salary, and incentive pay are likely to be simulta-
neously determined with investment. These variables are determined by unob-
servable factors such as ability or risk appetite, which are likely to be correlated
with error terms in our regressions, raising problems of omitted variable biases.
To deal with such problems, we tried to identify a set of instrumental variables
that were associated with endogenous variables but independent from the error
term. However, we were not able to nd satisfactory instruments. We there-
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fore decided to present for each model two di¤erent regressions using sets of
variables that included: (ii) only the variables that are safely exogenous (age,
Paris region, male, and interaction terms), and then (ii) the variables for which
endogeneity can be suspected.
Many of the variables that are determined by ability are likely to be
collinear. For instance, education, wage, and tenure could introduce multi-
collinearity. Potential problems of multicollinearity between independent vari-
ables are assessed using the Variance Ination Factor (VIF). Test values are high
in regressions that controlled for interaction terms. However, our postestima-
tion tests provide evidence that all VIF values are lower than 3 when we exclude
these terms. According to Craney and Surles (2002), multicollinearity problem
arises beyond a VIF value of 10. Consequently, such a problem is only driven
by the presence of interacted variables. We ran additional regressions without
these terms, which provided similar results for all variables (only the sign of the
coe¢ cient associated with age changed), and concluded that multicollinearity
issues do not a¤ect our results. To provide an idea of how severe the multi-
collinearity issue is, we provide a correlation matrix among all right-hand side
variable. In additional sensitivity analyses (not reported in the paper but avail-
able upon request), we ran regressions that controlled for these variables one by
one, in order to get additional information of how severe the multicollinearity
issue is in our models. Finally, we ran the models without and with the inverse
Mills ratio in order to be able to check the direction of the bias when selection is
not controlled for, and we ran models where the age and tenure variables were
broken into dummies, to further assess potential non-linear e¤ects with these
variables (not reported in the paper but available upon request).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the 43,362 employees of our sample.
Among them, 42.93% are men, mean age is 45.10 years (SD: 10.61), 54.62% live
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in the Paris region (SD: 8.04), 84.69% have a permanent contract (SD: 36.01),
and 3.92% hold a MastersDegree (SD: 19.41). Mean tenure is 16.30 years (SD:
13.64), the mean number of previous ESPPs o¤ered to these employees is 1.61
(SD: 0.75), and 35.00% (SD: 31.68%) of the company based savings is invested in
company stocks. Mean gross income and incentive pay are respectively e35,360
(SD: 21,552) and e4,356 (SD: 28,330). Among the employees of our sample,
21.31% (SD: 40.95) hold a position with privileged access to ESPPs information,
6.71% (SD: 25.02) have better nancial expertise, and 42.70% are in the upper
hierarchical categories. Finally, less than half of the sample invested in ESPPs
(46.02%, SD: 49.84), with a mean invested amount of e3,990 (SD: 6.747).
4.2 Bivariate analyses
Table 2 reports results of bivariable analyses comparing characteristics of in-
vestors vs. non-investors, and "active" investors vs. regular investors. Investors
(19,957 employees representing 46.02% of total) have di¤erent characteristics
than non-investors (53.98% of employees). They are more likely to be male,
to be younger, to live in the Paris region, to hold a permanent contract and
to hold a Masters Degree. Investors are also richer than non-investors: they
have greater gross income (respectively, e41,838 vs. e29,837) and they receive
larger incentive pay (respectively; e7,217 vs. e1,916). Finally, investors are
more likely to have invested in previous ESPPs, they have better nancial ex-
pertise, and they are better hierarchically ranked. In Table 2, we also compare
"active" investors (40.28% of investors) to employees who invest an amount
smaller than their incentive pay (59.72% of investors). "active" investors are
more likely to be male, to be younger, to live in the Paris region, to have higher
tenure, to hold a MastersDegree, to have invested in previous ESPPs, and to
have greater gross income and incentive pay. "active" investors are also more
likely to have invested in former ESPPs, they have a better access to the 2005
ESPPs information, a better nancial expertise and a higher hierarchical rank
in the company.
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4.3 Correlation matrix
Table 3 describes the correlation matrix of all independent variables selected in
our analyses. Large correlations involve age, tenure, permanent contract, and
the number of previous ESPPs employees were eligible to. Income and incentive
pay are highly correlated with gender, living in the Paris region, and education.
The human resource variable is correlated to age, permanent contract, income,
and tenure.
4.4 Factors associated with the conditional amounts in-
vested
Tables 4 and 5 provide results obtained after Heckman (columns (1) and (2))
and conditional OLS regressions (column (3)). Our variables measuring the
presence of liquidity constraint (income, incentive pay, and tenure) have posi-
tive and signicant associations with the probability of investing in the o¤er,
and the conditional amount invested. Knowledge about the o¤er, when mea-
sured with human resource department occupation, is not associated with the
probability of investing in the o¤er, but it is signicantly associated with the
conditional amount invested. However, the variable measuring the number of
previous o¤ers to which employees were eligible in the past has a negative as-
sociation with the probability of investing in ESPPs, and with the conditional
amount invested (Heckman). The variable describing asset choices through the
percentage invested in previous ESPPs has a positive and signicant association
with both the probability of investing in the o¤er and the conditional amount
invested. The absence of transaction costs, measured with the variable describ-
ing the presence of nancial knowledge, has positive and signicant associations
with the probability of investing in the o¤er, and the conditional amount in-
vested. Other factors signicantly associated with the probability of investment
and with the conditional amount invested are: tenure (+), male (+), Masters
Degree (+), and higher hierarchical category (+).
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4.5 Factors associated with the conditional probability of
being an "active" investor
Tables 6 and 7 report results from Heckprob regressions (columns (1) and (2))
and the probit regressions (column (3)). Two variables measuring the pres-
ence of potential liquidity constraints (income and tenure) have a signicant
positive association with the conditional probability of being an "active" in-
vestor. However, we nd evidence of a negative association between incentive
pay and the conditional probability of being an "active" investor. In the Heck-
prob model, privileged knowledge about the o¤er, measured by the variable
describing whether the employee works in the human resource department, is
not signicantly associated with the conditional probability of being an "active"
investor. However, this variable is signicant at the 10% level in the conditional
probit model (-), and eligibility to former o¤ers has a negative association.
Employees who invested in former o¤ers (and do not face Access choice limi-
tations) have higher probability of being "active" investors. In the conditional
probit model, employees with lower transaction costs, e.g. with better nancial
expertise, have a lower probability of being "active" investors. Other factors
associated with the conditional probability of being an "active" investor are:
age (+), gender (+), tenure (-), Mastersdegree (+), and higher hierarchical
category (+). Finally, our interaction terms (Tenure  Age;Male  Paris)
have positive and signicant associations with the probability of investing in
ESPPs and the conditional probability of being an "active" investor.
5 Discussion
Originally, ESPPs were introduced in France to provide an opportunity to em-
ployees to get involved in their rms management. Employees who participate
in these plans are allowed to elect board employee directors. Over the past
decades, shareholding has increased a lot in France (+10% between 1997 and
2007) and ESPPs have become very popular. Previous research (Arrondel and
Masson, 2007) provided evidence that French shareholders have specic pro-
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les: they work in the private sector, have a high-level of qualication, and
belong to an older part of the population (50-59 years old). Our results must
be interpreted regarding to that specic context.
5.1 Main ndings
We nd a positive association between amounts invested and education level:
compared with other employees, employees holding an MastersDegree have
higher ESPPs investments. It can be argued that our education variable is based
upon the degree observed and only captures general human capital information.
However, additional variables (hierarchical rank and tenure) that capture spe-
cic skills also have a positive association with ESPPs investments.
We nd the presence of a novelty e¤ect: savers invest larger amounts if they
have never had an access to ESPPs. However, this e¤ect is tempered by the fact
that employees who already invested in previous ESPPs had higher amounts in-
vested and higher probability of being "active" investors. Age has an important
association with investment decisions. Oldest employees may adopt o¤ensive
investment patterns because retirement is an early withdrawal motive. Results
for the cross-variable between age and tenure shows that this e¤ect is blurred
by age, that is, the e¤ect of time with the company diminishes with age. As em-
ployees reach retirement age, they are able to withdraw funds without penalty,
even if they have participated in the o¤er soon before they leave. Employees
who have been working for a long time in the rm are aware of tax benet
resulting from an investment in ESPPs. Their learning-by-doing background
leads them to maximize the gain linked to tax benet. Moreover, employees
who have spent more time in the bank may be more concerned by corporate
governance issues.
The positive relationship between permanent contracts and investment be-
haviors shows that risk on labor income seems to deter employees to invest in
their company stocks. This result di¤ers from previous researches on French
data underlining the existence of a positive correlation between job uncertainty
and investment in stocks (Arrondel and Masson, 2007). As one of ESPPs goals is
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to associate employees with the companys development, it can be assumed that
employees who hold permanent contract are more likely to involve in corporate
governance.
The presence of signicant correlation between error terms obtained in 2-
steps regressions conrm that unobserved variables have a huge inuence on
investorschoices. There are two possible economic interpretations of this re-
sult, which come from the inuence of two factors that are usually very di¢ cult
to observe in empirical studies. The signicant Heckmans lambda can be in-
terpreted by the fact that ESPPs investors have a lower risk aversion than
non-investors, which inuences the amounts of wealth they decide to allocate to
these plans. Moreover, nding signicant correlations between both steps may
reect di¤erences in time preference between investors and non-investors. Some
investors may have lower time preference than non-investors and may therefore
be more likely to choose investments that are blocked for a 5-year period.
5.2 What determines non-participation?
Our results conrm Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) assumptions according
to which liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice,
and transaction costs contribute to explain non-participation. Our results also
show that ESPPs contributors have very specic and unobserved motivations,
as shown with the positive correlations between error terms in the two steps
of investment decisions. It can be assumed that ESPPs investors di¤er from
other investors because they have a strong motivation to buy their own com-
pany stocks: the opportunity to participate in the corporate governance. Some
employees may choose to invest because they are concerned by the companys
management. In this case, investment would reveal another aspect of peoples
aversion. Cohen (2008) suggests that being loyal employees a¤ects employees
investment decision about their company stocks in 401(k).
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5.3 Limitations
Our paper has several limitations. We were not able to measure matching con-
tributions and the amount of tax-deductions, which have been shown to have im-
portant inuence on investment behavior. Gale and Scholz (1994) and Benartzi
(2001) provided evidence that matching contribution mechanisms are associated
with increased investments in company-based saving plans. We were not able to
measure the association between tax incentives that are bundled with incentive
pays investment and investment behaviors. It is likely that non-participants
have lower interest in tax-incentive associated with ESPPs investments due to
the level of their overall taxable income. However, previous research has showed
that the relationship between tax incentives and saving behaviors is uncertain
(Börsch-Supan, 2004). According to Engen and Gale (1997), tax incentives in
ESPPs can sometimes be lower than tax incentives found in other investment
plans. Hausman and Poterba (1987) show that tax incentives could actually be
associated with a slight decrease in private savings.
This paper uses cross-sectional dataset collected in 2005, after the com-
pany stocks prize has increased during four consecutive years. This may be
a limitation of our ndings since Benartzi (2001) found that past returns are
key determinants of employeesinvestment in their company stocks. Future re-
search may ideally use panel-data controlling for stocks price historical returns
or focus on cross-sectional data collected during the context of a bear market.
Our data were collected in a nancial institution. It can be assumed that em-
ployees working in a¢ liates such as investment bank, funding bank, and private
equity bank have a good nancial knowledge. This feature may explain why in
our sample human capital is positively correlated with investment in ESPPs.
Indeed, studying a bank implies that most employees have a good basic knowl-
edge of nance, so the interpretation of some variables is less straightforward.
Specically, higher tenure could be associated with better nancial expertise.
Moreover, we nd that employees with nancial expertise have a lower prob-
ability of being "active" investors. Such employees have doubtlessly access to
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information dealing with much more lucrative nancial products o¤ered by their
company such as stocks options. This result can be explained by the assumption
of bounded rationality. Employees who have strongest nancial knowledge may
choose not to invest in ESPPs because they can nd less constraining investment
opportunities and a better diversication of risks. Because of the specicity of
our sample, our results may not be generalized to other companies.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides an innovative study of ESPPs contributors investment
strategies, distinguishing "active" investors from other investors. This approach
allows comparing two di¤erent investment behaviors that are associated with
the willingness of investing in company stocks. We test Engelhardt and Madrian
(2004) assumptions about the determinants of non-participation. Liquidity con-
straint is measured by gross income, incentive pay, and tenure. In order to assess
the employeesknowledge of the plan, we identify which department of the com-
pany each employee belongs to and how many ESPPs they have been eligible
to. Concerning the asset choice, we know how much employees contributed to
ESPPs investments in the past. Finally, we make the assumption that transac-
tion costs are lower for employees holding a job requiring nancial expertise.
We nd that the presence of liquidity constraint, imperfect knowledge of
the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs are related to the investment deci-
sions. Specically, employees facing liquidity constraints are less likely to invest
in ESPPs. Knowledge about the plan is positively associated with the will-
ingness to invest: employees who work in the companydepartment in charge
of organizing ESPPs have a greater probability of investing in the o¤er, and
a greater probability of becoming an "active" investor. Employee owners have
higher probability of being "active" investors, showing that asset choice is asso-
ciated with investment decisions. Finally, lower transaction costs are associated
with higher investment probabilities, higher conditional amounts invested, and
higher conditional probability of being "active" investors.
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We nd the presence of a novelty e¤ect, as the largest amounts invested
were by employees who have not already been eligible to previous o¤ers. The
existence of unobservable motives of investment can be explained by a lower
risk aversion, a higher time preference, or a strong willingness to participate to
corporate governance. We underline that some investors may only be motivated
by a short-term interest, or the willingness to prepare themselves to future risks
such as unemployment.
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Appendix
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male (vs. Female) 0.429 0.495 0 100
Age (years) 45.103 10.61 10 71
Paris (yes vs. no) 0.546 0.498 0 100
Permanent contract (yes vs. no) 0.847 0.36 0 100
Mastersdegree (yes vs. no) 0.039 0.194 0 100
Number of previous o¤er 1.615 0.745 0 2
Tenure (years) 16.303 13.64 0 45
Income (in e) 35,359 21,551 1 650,000
Incentive pay (in e) 4,355 28,329 0 1,8,000,000
Human resources department 0.213 0.409 0 100
Financial expertise (yes vs. no) 0.0671 0.250 0 100
Hierarchical rank > 6 0.427 0.495 0 100
Investment (yes vs. no) 0.460 0.4984 0 100
Amount invested (in e) 3,990 6,747 0 100
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Table 2: Mean Characteristics of Non-investors, Investors, and Active Investors
Variable Non investor Investor Passive Active
Overall 0.530 0.460*** 0.597 0.402***
Male 36.78 50.14*** 38.97 48.79***
Age 45.62 44.49*** 45.38 44.69***
Paris 0.478 0.625*** 0.505 0.606***
Permanent contract 0.819 0.878*** 0.831 0.870***
Mastersdegree 0.022 0.059*** 0.032 0.048***
Number of previous o¤er 1.62 1.61 1.61 1.63**
Tenure 17.24 15.21*** 16.76 15.62***
Income 29,837 41,838*** 32,435 39,696***
Incentive pay 1,916 7,217*** 4,050 4,809**
Human resources department 0.211 0.215 0.210 0.217**
Financial expertise 0.035 0.103*** 0.057 0.080***
Hierarchical rank 0.327 0.543*** 0.346 0.0546***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Amounts invested conditional on participation -exogeneous variables-
Heckman Conditional OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Prob(invest) Log(amount) Log(amount)
Age 0.135*** -0.012 0.107***
(0.005) (0.021) (0.006)
Age  Age -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Paris 0.277*** 0.134*** 0.397***
(0.017) (0.049) (0.018)
Male 0.295*** 0.234*** 0.510***
(0.018) (0.052) (0.020)
Male  Paris 0.106*** 0.025 0.079***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.025)
Mean ESPP investment per department -1.668***
(0.197)
lambda -1.358***
(0.222)
Constant -2.370*** 9.754*** 6.046***
(0.130) (0.627) (0.117)
Observations 43,362 19,957 19,957
R-squared 0.163
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Amounts invested in ESPP, conditional on participation -all variables-
Heckman Conditional OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Prob(invest) log(amount) log(amount)
Age 0.119*** 0.222*** 0.111***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.007)
Age  Age -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Paris 0.138*** 0.293*** 0.122***
(0.018) (0.034) (0.016)
Male 0.016 0.278*** 0.250***
(0.020) (0.035) (0.018)
Male  Paris 0.085*** 0.058 0.016
(0.027) (0.044) (0.022)
Tenure -0.049*** -0.104*** -0.060***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Tenure  Age 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(income) 0.585*** 1.405*** 0.771***
(0.020) (0.065) (0.014)
log(incentive pay) 0.018*** 0.036*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Percentage in former ESPP 1.013*** 1.261*** 0.218***
(0.021) (0.101) (0.019)
Permanent contract 0.184*** 0.206*** -0.011
(0.026) (0.045) (0.020)
Human resources 0.081 0.242*** 0.145***
(0.049) (0.078) (0.038)
Number of previous o¤ers -0.119*** -0.109*** 0.032*
(0.022) (0.038) (0.018)
Financial knowledge 0.301*** 0.563*** 0.232***
(0.031) (0.050) (0.019)
Mastersdegree 0.156*** 0.257*** 0.153***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.023)
Hierarchical rank >6 0.240*** 0.331*** 0.054***
(0.015) (0.034) (0.012)
Mean ESPP investment per department -1.187***
(0.228)
lambda 1.790***
(0.155)
Constant -12.595*** -8.496*** -1.772***
(1.025) (0.224) (0.164)
Observations 43,362 19,957 19,957
R-squared 0.364
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30
Table 6: Probability of being an active investor, conditional on participation
-exogeneous variables-
Heckprob Conditional Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Prob(invest) Prob(active) Prob(active)
Age 0.118*** 0.067*** -0.015
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011)
Age  Age -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Paris 0.259*** -0.126*** -0.471***
(0.017) (0.036) (0.040)
Male 0.284*** -0.065* -0.382***
(0.019) (0.037) (0.044)
Male  Paris 0.101*** 0.162*** 0.194***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.052)
Mean number of investors per department 0.019***
(0.001)
rho 1.104***
(0.073)
Constant -3.711*** -1.069*** 1.745***
(0.111) (0.218) (0.225)
Observations 43,362 19,957 19,957
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Probability of being an active investor, conditional on participation
-all variables-
Heckprob Conditional Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Prob(invest) Prob(active) Prob(active)
Age 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.079***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.018)
Age  Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Paris 0.135*** 0.022 -0.090*
(0.018) (0.044) (0.050)
Male 0.009 0.169*** 0.158***
(0.020) (0.045) (0.054)
Male  Paris 0.091*** 0.104* 0.132**
(0.026) (0.053) (0.063)
Tenure -0.038*** -0.025** -0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013)
Tenure  Age 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(income) 0.566*** 0.841*** 0.699***
(0.020) (0.050) (0.056)
log(incentive pay) 0.021*** -0.565*** -0.673***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.020)
Percentage in former ESPP 1.014*** 0.824*** 0.481***
(0.021) (0.052) (0.054)
Permanent contract 0.111*** 0.185*** 0.098
(0.026) (0.057) (0.067)
Human resources 0.053 -0.110 -0.209*
(0.049) (0.109) (0.126)
Number of previous o¤ers -0.142*** -0.071* -0.005
(0.022) (0.043) (0.049)
Financial knowledge 0.164*** 0.053 -0.118***
(0.032) (0.043) (0.044)
Mastersdegree 0.168*** 0.067 -0.005
(0.035) (0.045) (0.049)
Hierachical rank >6 0.242*** 0.117*** -0.028
(0.015) (0.034) (0.034)
Mean number of investors per department 0.012***
(0.001)
rho 0.883***
(0.110)
Constant -9.123*** -6.728*** -2.765***
(0.213) (0.564) (0.542)
Observations 43,362 19,957 19,957
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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